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RESUMO: A narrativa de experiências de 
sofrimentos insuportáveis traz esperança, apresso 
pelo próprio destino, orgulho por quem fomos, 
uma espécie de reconciliação com o mundo? Este 
é exatamente o tipo de expectativa que Hannah 
Arendt atribui à narrativa. A particular habilidade 
humana de relembrar e retar tanto suas próprias 
estórias como a de outros pertence a um dos mais 
significativos tópicos da inscrição arendtiana sobre 
narrativa e reconciliação. O poder redentor da 
narrativa possui ao menor uma fundamental 
dimensão abordada por esse artigo: a capacidade 
de contar a própria estória, narrar quem (who) se 
é, implica a possibilidade de reconciliação com o 
próprio passado. A questão mais relevante é que 
ser narrador de sua própria estória se conecta com 
a possibilidade de uma reconciliação que não é 
prívada, mas antes pública, e implica a abilidade 
de julgar. A reconciliação com nossa própria 
estória implica reconciliação com o espaço público 
de aparência, no vocabulário arendtiano, com o 
mundo plural de fala e ação.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: narrativa; espaço público; 
Hannah Arendt; reconciliação; natalidade; 
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ABSTRACT: How can the narrative of our 
ungrateful experiences, the facing of unbearable 
sufferings, bring hopefulness, love for our destines, 
and pride for who we have been in life, and a sort 
of reconciliation with the world, reconciliation 
with the public space of appearance? This is 
exactly the kind of expectation Arendt assigns for 
narrative. That we have a particular human ability 
to recollect, to remember and retell our and others’ 
stories belong to the major topics on Hannah 
Arendt’s writings on narrative and reconciliation. 
It has at least one crucial dimension this paper will 
deal with. More closely related to the redemptive 
power of narrative, we have the potential to be 
tellers of our own stories, narrators of who we have 
been in life. Here imagination and recollection 
help reconciliation towards our own past. By 
telling our own story, we may become the 
protagonist of who we are and thereby, as an 
outcome, we can reconcile ourselves with our life 
experiences. The main question here is that to be 
the storyteller of our own story is deeply connected 
with the possibility of a public reconciliation and 
our ability to judging. The reconciliation with our 
story here implies also reconciliation with the 
public space of appearance, namely by Arendt, the 
plural world of acting and speech.
KEYWORDS: narrative; public space; Hannah 
Arendt; reconciliation; natality; judgment.
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Life is not what one has lived, but rather the life 
one recollects and how one recollects it to tell.
Gabriel García Márquez1
‘My life, I will not let you go except you bless 
me, but then I will let you go.’ The reward of 
storytelling is to be able to let go: ‘When the 
storyteller is loyal … to the story, there, in the 
end, silence will speak. Where the story has 
been betrayed, silence is but emptiness. But we, 
the faithful, when we have spoken our last word, 
will hear the voice of silence’.
Hannah Arendt2
Under the guise of introduction, I quote 
an intriguing question pointed out by Pirro 
concerning Arendt’s approach on narrative, 
which underlines the main propose of this 
paper: “why should stories of failed strivings 
and ruined aspirations foster a sense of hope 
rather then despair? After all, remembrance 
of a lost cause seems a slender reed on which 
to rest one’s hopes.”3 How can the narrative 
of our ungrateful experiences, the facing of 
unbearable sufferings, bring hopefulness, 
love for our destines and pride for who we 
have been in life, and a sort of reconciliation 
with the world, reconciliation with the public 
space of appearance? This is exactly the kind 
of expectation Arendt assigns for narrative. 
By the attempt to relate our fate with the 
question who we are, Arendt quotes Isak 
1 [La vida no es la que uno vivió, sino la que uno 
recuerda y cómo la recouerda para contarla.] Gabriel 
García Márquez, Vivir para contarla. Barcelona: 
Mondadori, 2002, epigraph. 
2 ARENDT, Hannah, Men in Dark Times. New 
York/London: Harvest/HJB Book, 1983, p. 97 (Hereafter 
quoted as MDT)
3 PIRRO, Robert C., Hannah Arendt and the 
Politics of Tragedy. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2001, p. 21. (Hereafter quoted as Pirro, Hannah 
Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy).
Dinesen (Karen Blixen), one of her most 
influential exemplar storyteller figures, who 
says that “… in the repetition of imagination 
the happenings have become what she would 
call a ‘destine.’ To be so at one with one’s 
own destiny that no one will be able to tell 
the dancer from the dance, that the answer to 
the question, Who are you? Will be the 
Cardinal’s answer, ‘Allow me … to answer 
you in the classic manner, and to tell you a 
story,’ is the only aspiration worthy of the 
fact that life has been given us. This is also 
called pride, and the true dividing line 
between people is whether they are capable 
of being ‘in love with [their] destine’.”4 That 
we have a particular human ability to 
recollect, to remember and retell our and 
others’ stories belong to the major topics on 
Hannah Arendt’s writings on narrative and 
reconciliation. It has at least one crucial 
dimension this paper will deal with. More 
closely related to the redemptive power of 
narrative, we have the potential to be tellers 
of our own stories, narrators of who we have 
been in life. Here imagination and recollection 
help reconciliation towards our own past. By 
telling our own story, we may become the 
protagonist of who we are and thereby, as an 
outcome, we can reconcile ourselves with our 
life experiences. The main question here is 
that to be the storyteller of our own story is 
deeply connected with the possibility of a 
public reconciliation and our ability to 
judging. The reconciliation with our story 
here implies also reconciliation with the public 
space of appearance, namely by Arendt, the 
plural world of acting and speech.
4 Arendt, MDT 105
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I. NARRATIVE AND IMAGINATION – A 
REDEMPTIVE WAY OF THINKING
The intriguing, paradoxical condition of 
the faculty of thinking allows “the mind to 
withdraw from the world without ever being 
able to leave it or transcend it”.5 It justifies 
in the first place the use of metaphorical 
language and imagination, to employ the 
terms Arendt uses to articulate the imbrications 
among thinking, judging, narrative, and the 
visible world. Whether in silent critical 
thought or in concrete judgment, what is at 
stake are the outlooks and events of the 
appearing world transposed into ordinary 
language.6 In the case of thinking activity, it 
operates through a silent “conceptual 
metaphorical speech,” since thinking “must 
5 Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind – Thinking. 
New York/London: Ed. Harvest/ HJB Book, 1978, p. 45 
(Hereafter quoted as LMT). Taminiaux calls attention to 
this symmetry: “Not only do most of the words in 
ordinary language refer to the outlooks and aspects of 
entities appearing in the world, but even our most abstract 
way of speaking is full of metaphors which transpose to 
the activity of the mind words which are originally rooted 
in appearances. Originally, an idea is an outlook, a 
concept is a capture, a metaphor is a displacement, a 
reason is a ground, and son on.” Taminiaux, Jacques, 
“Time and the Inner Conflicts of the Mind,” In Hermsen, 
Joke, & Villa, Dana, (Eds.) The Judge and the Spectator- 
Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy. Leuven: Peeters, 
1999, p. 46. It is worth calling attention to the fact that 
Arendt is not making rigorous conceptual distinctions 
between any of those terms. See also: Taminiaux, 
Jacques, “Événement, Monde et Jugement,” in Esprit 
– Changer la culture et la politique, “Hannah Arendt,” 
N. 42, 2 édition, Juin, 1985, pp. 135-47.
6 Arendt would agree with Wittgenstein’s argument 
against a private language: “In all such reflecting 
activities men move outside the world of appearances 
and use a language filled with abstract words which of 
course, had long been part and parcel of everyday speech 
before they became the special currency of philosophy.” 
Arendt, LMT 78.
prepare the particulars given to the senses in 
such a way that the mind is able to handle 
them in their absence; it must, in brief, de-
sense them”.7 Nevertheless, thinking requires 
this visibility of being heard and understood 
by others. “Thought without speech is 
inconceivable; ‘thought and speech anticipate 
one another. They continually take each 
other’s place’”.8 From this sort of conceptual 
metaphorical speech, it is possible to trace 
the bridge between thinking and narrative. 
Narrative derives from human beings’ lived 
experience and therefore must remain tied to 
it. On the other hand, “what becomes manifest 
when we speak about psychic experiences is 
never the experience itself but whatever we 
think about it when we reflect upon it”9 
Thinking for Arendt has a very particular 
meaning. Thinking is not equated with the 
classical attributes of rationality as a cognitive 
faculty whose criterion is truth and which 
apprehends concepts through passive 
perceptions leading to objectively verifiable 
knowledge. At the same token, imagination 
is not described in the classical sense, in 
which it merely (re)-presents images, 
7 ARENDT, LMT 77.
8  ARENDT, ibid., 32. Quoting Merleau-Ponty. On 
the more general discussion on mental activity and 
politics, see: Gray, J. Glenn, “The Winds of Thought,” 
In Social Research. New York, (Spring 1977) Vol. 44: 
40-62; Ernst Vollrath, “Hannah Arendt and the Method 
of Political Thinking.” In Social Research, Vol. 44, N. 
1 (Spring 1977): 160 – 82; Jean Yarbrough & Peter Stern, 
“Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on 
Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought in The Life of the 
Mind,” in The Review of Politics, vol. 43, N. 3, (July 
1981), pp. 323-54; Hans Jonas, “Acting, Knowing, 
Thinking: Gleanings from Hannah Arendt’s Philosophical 
Work.” In Social Research. New York, 44/1 (Spring 
1977): 25-43.
9 ARENDT, LMT 31.
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schemas through which intellect and cognition 
operate. In those classical conceptions of 
imagination, logic arbitrates meaning; 
principle precedes prudence and general rules 
command particular circumstances. In 
Arendt’s understanding, by removing the 
object, imagination is not merely endowing 
judgment with the reproductive image to 
supply the concept, as in the case in 
determinant logic judgment.10 By de-sensing, 
imagination prepares the objects of thought 
for reflexive judgment.11 
10 Discussed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
in determinant judgment the particular is subsumed under 
a universally given law, rule or principle. In that case, 
the play between intellect and imagination is a matter of 
the pre-given categories of determinant judgment, 
deontological argumentation, or procedural rationality, 
where the role of imagination is merely to facilitate 
understanding – a re-presenting imagination that is 
basically imitative and reproductive. Abstract and 
universal schemas are the main outcome of imagination 
in determinant judgment, an operation of our universal 
cognitive rationality. On the other hand, reflective 
judgment rather encompasses a free play of imagination 
and understanding. In reflexive judgment, rather than 
intellect providing the rule, imagination provides an 
exemplary instance. This active perception is able to 
re-move objects and promote the enlargement of mind. 
This ethical imagination is the foundation for a 
subsequent operation, namely reflection, “the actual 
activity of judging something,” which gathers deep 
political implications. Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy. Edited with an interpretative 
essay by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, p. 68.
11  On Arendt’s account on reflective judgment 
see: Dostal, Robert, “Judging Human Action: Arendt’s 
Appropriation of Kant,” In The Review of Metaphysics, 
n. 134, 1984; Forti, Simona, “Sul ‘Giudizio Riflettente’ 
Kantiano: Arendt e Lyotard a Confronto.” In La Politica 
tra Natalità e Mortalita à Hannah Arendt. Edited by 
Eugenia Parise. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 
1993; Clarke, James p., “A Kantian Theory of Political 
Judgment – Arendt and Lyotard.” In Philosophy Today, 
Vol. 38, N. 1/4, (Summer 1994), 135-48; Ferrara, 
Alessandro, “Judgment, identity and authenticity: a 
The important feature here is the link 
Arendt establishes in language between the 
world of appearances and the mind’s realm 
of invisibility. “Thinking is the mental 
activity that actualizes those products of the 
mind that are inherent in speech and for which 
language, prior to any special effort, has 
already found an appropriate though 
provisional home in the audible world. If 
speaking and thinking springs from the same 
source, then the very gift of language could 
be taken as a kind of proof, or perhaps, rather, 
as a token, of men’s being naturally endowed 
with an instrument capable of transforming 
the invisible into an ‘appearance.’”12 In this 
context, metaphor, imagination, terms 
borrowed from visuality, take the deflated 
meaning of a “mind’s language” and restores 
thinking to the visible world. This elaborates 
what can be said through speech: a seeing 
through “bodily ears.” Indeed, metaphor calls 
for the primacy of the appearing world, but 
at the same time it attributes narrative an 
ability to apprehend the visible world apart 
from the chronological events of everyday 
life.13 Narrative interrupts space and time 
reconstruction of Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of 
Kant.” In Philosophy & Social Criticism, 1998, v.24-
2/3, p.110.
12 ARENDT, LMT 108-9.
13 In a longer passage Arendt highlights: “If the 
language of thinking is essentially metaphorical, it follows 
that the world of appearances inserts itself into thought 
quite apart from the needs of our body and the claims of 
our fellow-men, which will draw us back into it in any 
case. No matter how close we are while thinking to what 
is far way and how absent we are from what is close at 
hand, the thinking ego obviously never leaves the world 
of appearances altogether. The two-world theory, as I have 
said, is a metaphysical delusion although by no means an 
arbitrary or accidental one; it is the most plausible delusion 
with which the experience of thought is plagued. 
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inasmuch as it can make present to the mind 
a past event through remembrance and 
anticipate the future by foreseeing an event, in 
a non-chronological or logical rational way. 
Such path paved by imagination traces a small 
track of non-time in which imagination beats 
within the time-space of mortal men and into 
which the trains of thought, of remembrances 
and anticipation run through.14 “In terms of 
tragedy, conceptualizing (through philosophy, 
analysis, and maxim) cannot be compared with 
the intensity and richness of significance with 
a appropriately narrated story.”15 
II. THE MANUFACTURED 
LANGUAGE OF COGNITION – 
THE HABIT OF REPRODUCTIVE 
IMAGINATION
To feel at home in the world embraces the 
security of habits. The so-called “force of 
habit” is remarkably described by Augustine 
in Arendt’s Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin 
as “a kind of manufactured nature”16 whose 
immediate result is to put man at the service 
Language, by lending itself to metaphorical usage, enable 
us to think, that is, to have traffic with non-sensory matters, 
because it permits a carrying-over, metapherein, of our 
sense experiences. There are not two worlds because 
metaphor unites them.” Arendt, LMT 110.
14 ARENDT, Hannah, Between Past and Future – 
Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1977, p. 13. (Hereafter quoted as BPF) See: 
Jean-Claude Eslin, “L’Événement de Penser,” in Esprit – 
Changer la culture et la politique, “Hannah Arendt,” N. 
42, 2 édition, Juin, 1985, pp. 7-18.
15 ARENDT, MDT 22.
16 (On Music VI, 19) Arendt, Hannah, Love and 
Saint Augustine. Edited and with an Interpretive Essay 
by Joanna Scott and Judith Stark. Chicago/London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 82 (Hereafter 
quoted as LSA).
of made objects. Habit is then described as 
“manufactured”; it is a fabricated form of life, 
assigning human beings through the work of 
their hands to the production of the world. 
Arendt’s remarks from her 1929 doctoral 
thesis anticipate her account of pure cognitive 
knowledge as the philosophy of the homo 
faber par excellence in The Human Condition 
more than 30 years afterwards.17 
Cognition, which is based on an account 
of usefulness, embeds a kind of knowledge 
that, like homo faber’s activity, can be 
approached as “in order to,” in terms of 
utility. It is opposed to “for the sake of,” 
wh ich  i s  unde r s tood  i n  t e rms  o f 
meaningfulness.18 “Cognition always pursues 
a definite aim, which can be set by practical 
considerations as well as by ‘idle curiosity’; 
but once this aim is reached, the cognitive 
process has come to an end.”19 Cognition, like 
fabrication with its instruments and tools, is 
a process that leads to a proposition. It has a 
beginning and end and its utility can be 
demonstrated. Scientific results produced 
through cognition are added to human 
artifacts, like material things. Cognitive 
17 ARENDT, Hannah, The Human Condition. 
Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1989, p. 85 (Hereafter quoted as HC). Although labor 
stands for repetition and cyclical, associated with the 
biological process of living organism, and the process 
of growth and decay in the world, both leads to an endless 
self-consuming movement of nature.
18 In The Human Condition Arendt underscores: 
“This perplexity, inherent in all consistent utilitarianism, 
the philosophy of homo faber par excellence, can be 
diagnosed theoretically as an innate incapacity to 
understand the distinction between utility and 
meaningfulness, which we express linguistically by 
distinguishing between ‘in order to’ and ‘for the sake 
of.’” Arendt, HC 154.
19 ARENDT, ibid. 121.
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processes in science correspond to the 
function of cognition in fabrication.20 
Cognition, contributing to the fabrication of 
our world, is the invisible hand of the 
manufactured world, producing in us a kind 
of manufactured nature as well. It leads men 
to find durability and security in the man-
made habitual world, as opposed to the realm 
of contingency and unpredictability.21 Like 
the realm of homo faber, our fabricated habits 
provide the durability of the world. This is 
the sense in which one can say that “habit has 
already delivered him [man] to the world.”22 
Delivering ourselves to the world means the 
quiet process of composing life through 
habits. This is a result not only of the 
instrumentalization of the world, but mostly 
important here, of the instrumentalization of 
thinking and judging processes. The pure 
process of rationalization apprehends language 
in terms of cognitive logic process, operating 
under the edge of a reproductive imagination. 
The manufactured nature of language relies 
in fact on a reproductive imagination. 
20 In The Human Condition, Arendt distinguishes 
thinking and from logical reasoning: “In these human 
faculties we are actually confronted with a sort of brain 
power which in more than one respect resembles nothing 
so much as the labor power of the human animal develops 
in its metabolism with nature” Arendt, HC 172. This 
type of intelligence, which according to Arendt was 
mistaken for reason, is a mere substitute for human labor 
power. It is “a mere function of the life process itself, … 
Obviously, this brain power and the compelling logical 
processes it generates are not capable of erecting a world, 
are as worldless as the compulsory processes of life, 
labor, and consumption”. ARENDT, ibid. 172.
21  What assures reality is the regular presence of 
the object detached from us, the habits of cognition that 
shape passive perception.
22  ARENDT, LSA 82.
Approaching man as toolmaker and 
fabricator, as the embodied authority of the 
science of fabrication, as mastering epistémé 
poétiké, turns the processes of the realm of 
fabrication into the guarantor of reality. The 
result is to neglect unexpected experiences, 
those which fall outside the frame of means-
ends relationships, making us unable to think 
and to act not only in unpredictable situations, 
but also in unbearable experiences.23 Besides 
the encouraging habits, this has two 
unavoidable outcomes. First, it promotes an 
over-valorization of a mental and material 
sense of reality based mainly on mechanization; 
and second, it thereby promotes what can be 
called the security of an enduring yesterday. 
At the same time that habit contributes to the 
world’s enduringness, it creates a false 
security in reality. As remarkably annunciated 
by Arendt, already in 1928: “habit is the 
eternal yesterday and has no future. Its 
tomorrow is identical with today.”24 In the 
mechanization of language, the enduring 
yesterday is the only rain material left to be 
processed by narrative language. Nevertheless, 
it is through narrative, and not in cognitive 
logic process of language in and by itself that 
a non-time and unpredictable reconciliation 
with the unbearable is possible.
Diametrically opposed to the security of 
habit is thaumadzein, the speechless wonder 
identified with the beginning of the 
philosophical pathos. It was first equated with 
23  See Arendt, HC 300. In terms of political 
philosophy, it coincides with the creation of the modern 
political vocabulary, in which, for instance, one speaks 
of the “fabrication” of “tools” and “instruments” for 
the creation of the “artificial man” called the State: 
Hobbes’ Leviathan.
24  ARENDT. LSA 83.
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astonishment in the face of the miracle of 
man, life, and the cosmos as described by 
Plato in the Theaetetus (155) and Aristotle in 
the Metaphysics (982b12 ff). In Socratic 
terms, wonder bears a power to dislodge us 
from everyday affairs, from “that which is as 
it is.” In order to confront the “dogmatism of 
mere opinion,” Arendt argues, Plato makes 
this speechless wonder into a way of life (the 
bios theôrétikos) – philosophy’ state of 
contemplation in which theória has became 
“only another word for thaumadzein; the 
contemplation of truth at which the 
philosopher ultimately arrives is the 
philosophically purified speechless wonder 
with which he began.”25 When converted into 
theória, however, wonder is reduced to 
cognition, the mental apparatus of homo 
faber. To prolong wonder is to crystallize 
yesterday inasmuch as there is no longer 
room for perplexity. It is under the aegis of 
this mental process of fabrication that 
totalitarianism was able to mechanize the 
real: through the power of logical reasoning, 
of cognition, its instruments and tools were 
able to build a self-explanatory picture of a 
rather horrifying reality.
Speechless astonishment must remain one 
moment in the capacity to be ready to join a 
new pathos of narrative, a necessary 
estrangement from the everyday life of 
human affairs. This original wonder was just 
a fleeting moment “or, to take Plato’s own 
metaphor, the flying spark of fire between 
25 ARENDT. HC 302. It is in that sense, as the 
dimension of contemplative truth, that thaumadzein is 
opposed to doxadzein, in other words, to a substitution 
of Greek thaumadzein by the Cartesian doubt. See 
Arendt, HC 273, 302-304.
two flintstones,”26 a spark able to make the 
enduring yesterday strange. It is this original 
fleeting moment of strangeness with habitual, 
given in daily life that incites narrative. 
Particularly by the “normality, and habituality” 
of the horror experienced in the catastrophic 
political events of last half of the Twenty 
Century, in particular, the Holocaust and its 
concentration camps, sealed by what Hannah 
Arendt called “images of Hell on earth.” 
Against the safeness of habit, wonder, 
perplexity, summons narrative, the act of 
awareness activated for the sake of 
meaningfulness. The activity of thinking, the 
rain material of narrative, holds the same 
inexorability and recurrence as life itself: it 
“is as relentless and repetitive as life itself, 
and the question whether thought has any 
meaning at all constitutes the same 
unanswerable riddle as the question for the 
meaning of life; its processes permeate the 
whole of human existence so intimately that 
its beginning and end coincide with the 
beginning and end of human life itself.”27 
By despatializing the topos of narrative, 
Arendt emphasizes the human being’s 
capacity of driving and placing the ‘past’ 
through remembrance and the future through 
expectation. By positing memories and 
prospects, narrative is able to drive temporality. 
This insertion echoes Augustine’s distinction 
between the principium of the world and the 
initium of man as well as in his reflections on 
the notion of time in Confessions. The world 
of all other living creatures was created “in 
numbers” and cycles, corresponding to the 
fabrica Dei. As man expresses his uniqueness 
26 ARENDT, Hannah, “Philosophy and Politics.” In 
Social Research, Vol. 57, N. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 101. 
27 ARENDT, HC 171.
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by initium, by inserting himself into this in-
between present he breaks up the continuum. 
“Because they are focused on the particle or 
body that gives them their direction, being 
fighting with each other and acting upon man 
is the way Kafka describes.”28 Time is defined 
here by the nature of man’s activities. In the 
everyday of animal laborans and homo faber, 
inasmuch as what takes place is “the continuity 
of our business and our activities in the world 
in which we continue what we started 
yesterday and hope to finish tomorrow,”29 this 
continuum determines and conditions time 
into spatial increments and cyclical time 
states. It is precisely in such terms that the 
time of our historical and biographical 
existence can be “understood in analogy to 
numerical sequences, fixed by the calendar, 
according to which the present is today, the 
past begins yesterday, and the future begins 
tomorrow.”30 In the Confessions, the 
philosopher of Hippo coins a remarkable 
expression to illustrate time, namely, “a 
present act of attention.” This relocates the 
three time dimensions through the act of 
attention: the past through memory, the future 
through expectation, and the present as the 
act of our attention in both directions. The 
present therefore cannot be measured in time, 
since it has no tense between what just 
happened and what will happen. Rather then 
three tenses spatially located as a past 
“behind” and a future “ahead,” the present 
act of attention towards the past through 
narrative relies on memory.31
28  ARENDT, BPF 11.
29  ARENDT, LMT 205.
30  ARENDT, Ibid.
31  Augustine, Confessions, Translated by F.J. 
Sheed, with an introduction by Peter Brown. Indianapolis/ 
III. NARRATIVE AND 
CREATIVE IMAGINATION: 
A DELIBERATIVE 
RECOLLECTING FROM THE 
STOREHOUSE OF MEMORY
Recalling Kafka’s parable, Arendt 
mentions so often, one could say that 
narrative, in being able to displace the 
appearing world, produces what Arendt calls 
“diagonal forces” – its “own self-inserting 
appearance, created by past and future forces, 
found a place in time which is sufficiently 
removed from past and future to offer ‘the 
umpire’ a position from which to judge the 
forces fighting with each other with an 
impartial eye.”32 The non-time element of 
narrative relies on its reflective ability to 
locate and to place human beings through 
their memories and expectations, not only 
regarding absent objects. Memory holds all 
the dispositions of recollection and stories. 
“Only because of the mind’s capacity for 
making present what is absent can we say ‘no 
more’ and constitute a past for ourselves, or 
say ‘not yet’ and get ready for a future.”33 
Narrative turns us able to constitute a past for 
ourselves, and prepare us to a future. It means 
that narrative’s attribute of making present 
what is temporally or spatially absent contains 
the very condition of judging.
Relying on Augustine’s account of 
memory – what he calls “the fields and vast 
palaces of memory,”34 – Arendt distinguishes 
Cambridge: Heckett Publishing Company Inc., 1993, 
(Book Eleven, XX, p. 223) (Hereafter quoted as 
Augustine, Confessions).
32  ARENDT, BPF 12.
33  ARENDT, LMT 76.
34  As meaningfully put by Augustine: “And so I 
come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where 
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between two different steps of memory, “what 
remains in the memory,” and “the vision in 
thought,” in order to describe two operations 
in apprehending the appearing world. “‘The 
vision, which was without when the sense 
was formed by a sensible body, is succeeded 
by a similar vision within’ (Book XI, ch.3) 
the image that re-presents it. The image is 
then stored in memory, ready to become a 
‘vision of thought the moment the mind gets 
hold of it; it is decisive that ‘what remains in 
the memory – the mere image of what once 
was real – is different from the ‘vision in 
thought’ – the deliberately remembered 
object.”35 The act of just retaining an image 
in memory is distinct from the actual act of 
remembering. Memory’s ability to retain an 
image is different from its ability to impress 
in the image how and what to remember.36 
Arendt uses Augustine’s terminology to 
separate the “visible sense-object” from the 
“image” the memory holds of it, and to 
distinguish both from the “thought-object,” 
a deliberate act of recollection and 
remembrance. Hence, all thinking is in fact 
are stored the innumerable images of material things 
brought to it by the senses. Further there is stored in the 
memory the thoughts we think, by adding to or taking 
from or otherwise modifying the things that sense has 
mad contact with, and all other things that have been 
entrusted to an laid up in memory, save such as 
forgetfulness has swallowed in its grave.” Augustine, 
Confessions, Book X, VIII, p. 178.
35 ARENDT, LMT 77.
36 See Arendt, Ibid. (Augustine, Trinity, Book XI, 
chaps. III, VIII, and, X) “It is because of the twofold 
transformation of the thinking ‘in fact goes even further,’ 
beyond the realm of all possible imagination, ‘when our 
reason proclaims the infinity of number which no vision 
in the thought of corporeal things has yet grasped’ or 
‘teaches us that even the tiniest bodies ca be divided 
infinitely.’” Arendt, Ibid.
a re-thinking, an “after-thought” that requires 
an “umpire.” Thinking is an act of judging 
under the image requiring a vision-in-thought 
of the stored image.37
By distinguishing the simply apprehension 
of an image from the active recollection, 
Arendt underlines the intrinsic link between 
a reflexive imagination, working through 
memory’s act of recollecting, and narrative. 
Even though it is through reproductive 
imagination that the mind stores a image, 
“these thought-objects come into being only 
when the mind actively and deliberately 
remembers, recollects and selects from the 
storehouse of memory… .”38 This capacity 
to ‘de-sense’ a sense-object, which itself 
never appears to the mind, transforming it 
into an image, belongs to the imagination. 
This operation is carried out by what Arendt 
calls a mere “reproductive imagination,” 
which can be identified with an “elementary 
ability to de-sense and have present before 
(and not just in) your mind what is physically 
absent.”39 On the other hand, it stands a 
“productive imagination,” or creative 
imagination, which, though dependant upon 
the reproductive imagination, promotes 
deliberative selection, a re-location and 
attribution of meaning to the image. Through 
37 “Nor indeed do the things themselves enter: only 
the images of the things perceived by the senses are there 
for thought to remember them.” Augustine, Confessions, 
VIII, p. 179 Augustine still calls attention to the fact that 
since we remember this the memory, we are not disturbed 
by the emotional qualities of the forth movements 
(disturbances) of the mind (mens, soul): desire, joy, fear, 
sadness.
38 ARENDT LMT 77.
39 ARENDT Ibid., 86.
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the power of imagination man enlarges his 
capacity to narrate, to come up with a story 
able to deal with reality. I claim that 
imagination is one of the key features through 
which narrative calls for reconciliation with 
our past and tragic stories. “The world is full 
of stories, of events and occurrences and 
strange happenings, which wait only to be 
told, and the reason why they usually remain 
untold is, according to Isak Dinesen, lack of 
imagination – for only if you can image what 
has happened anyhow, repeat it in imagination, 
will you see the stories…. Without repeating 
life in imagination you can never be fully 
alive, ‘lack of imagination’ prevents people 
from ‘existing.’ ‘Be loyal to the story,’ … 
means no less than, Be loyal to life, don’t 
create fiction but accept what life is giving 
you, show yourself worthy of whatever it may 
be by recollecting and pondering over it, thus 
repeating it in imagination; this is the way to 
remain alive.’”40 Inasmuch as narrative’s 
capacity of creative imagination is an activity, 
it implies a sort of ethical imagination, since 
this capacity to transform sense-objects into 
images involves a capacity of judging.
We have rather become used to limiting 
the world of sense perception to reproductive 
imagination. It is fundamental that by creative 
imagination, Arendt emphasizes that we 
select not only what to remember but also 
how to remember. The capacity of fixing on 
how we produce impressions from within the 
palaces of memory has a deep impact in the 
conduct of your own life. The faculty of 
memory that allows mental enlargement, the 
40 ARENDT MDT 97. Emphasis added. Later 
published as “Foreword” in Isak Dinesen, Daguerreotypes 
and Other Essays, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1979.
expansion of our ethical imagination, is 
inextricably linked to the ability to judge. 
Arendt adds the powerful role of narrative to 
this account, since we face our sorrows 
literally by how remembering, as much as by 
sharing our stories with others. 
IV. NARRATIVE, JUDGMENT 
AND RECONCILIATION: A 
METAPHORICAL NATALITY
In the 1964 Chicago manuscript on Kant 
and judgment, Arendt links appearance, 
judgment, and reconciliation: “We never are 
so much members of the sensible world of 
members of the human society than when we 
judge of appearance qua appearances. And 
with respect to communicability as the great 
source of joy in life, I remain you of Isak 
Dinesen’s: ‘All sorrows can be borne if you 
put them into a story or tell a story about 
them.’ That is, if you communicate. Even 
grief carries with in an element of joy if it is 
being told about.”41 Let me take back the 
question that introduced this paper pointed 
out by Pirro concerning Arendt’s approach: 
“why should stories of failed strivings and 
ruined aspirations foster a sense of hope 
rather then despair? After all, remembrance 
of a lost cause seems a slender reed on which 
to rest one’s hopes.”42 The tears of 
41 ARENDT, Hannah, “Kant’s Political Philosophy”. 
Seminar, Fall 1964, Chicago University. Unpublished 
Manuscript. Hannah Arendt’s Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, p. 
0322580. 
42 PIRRO, Hannah Arendt and the Politics of 
Tragedy, p. 21. On Arendt’s account on redemption 
and narrative see: Benhabib, Seyla “Hannah Arendt 
and the Redemptive Power of Narrative.” In Social 
Research, Vol. 57, No.1 (Spring 1990), pp.157-96; 
Hammer, Dean C., “Incommensurable Phrases and 
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remembrance bear not only the pure act of 
bringing the past back through memory, as a 
closed book to be read. The key element in 
Arendt’s account on the power of narrative 
relies precisely on the potentiality of some 
unexpected moments of new beginning, by 
keeping the meanings of our despair into 
motion. It holds the possibility of the 
unpredictable moment of a metaphorical 
natality, in which reconciliation no longer can 
be predictable through the regular rational 
account by a mere accountability of our 
sufferings.43 “The story reveals the meaning 
of what otherwise would remain an unbearable 
sequence of sheer happenings.”44 Here one 
can subsume that narrative carries an element 
of unpredictability. The act of narrating 
brings the capacity to open up a new 
understanding of the past. Such redemptive 
Narrative Discourse – Lyotard and Arendt on the 
Possibility of Politics.” In Philosophy Today, Vol. 41, 
N. 4/4, (Winter 1997), pp. 475-90.
43  Even though out of the scope of this paper, it is 
noteworthy to mention that Arendt’s account of narrative 
echoes our capacity to forgive. There can be slender 
doubt that reconciliation is at least on the way to 
forgiveness. Narrative’s power of redemption is deeply 
imbricated with the power to forgive. “The possible 
redemption from the predicament of irreversibility – of 
being unable to undo what one has done though one did 
not, and could not, have known what he was doing – is 
the faculty of forgiving.” Arendt, HC 237. Forgiveness 
depends on plurality and communication, since it “rests 
on the experiences which nobody could ever have with 
himself, which on the contrary, are entirely based on the 
presence of others.” Arendt HC 238. It would remain 
without reality if occurred in solitude or isolation. In the 
act of forgiving others, the use of imagination is 
extended, carrying an ethical redemptive dimension. 
Forgiveness is not merely an appendix of contingence; 
it is rather a sort of actuality, a potentiality. It is not a 
mere side effect of our actions. See: Pirro, Hannah 
Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy. 
44  ARENDT, MDT 104
appeal of the storytelling through remembrance 
moves precisely among concreteness, 
particularity, and contingency of human 
affairs. If, by one hand, it is a way of dealing 
with real l ife,  rather then a simple 
psychological internal dimension of the mind 
to self justify excuses or resentments. On the 
other hand, narrative can operate imagination 
as a capacity for “entirely free thinking, 
which employs neither history nor coercive 
logic as crutches.”45 
Through the abilities of thinking and 
judging, narrative reaches a dimension far 
beyond language reduced to cognition, the 
mental apparatus of homo faber’s fabrication, 
as it has been approached before. Narrative 
achieves a level beyond the over-valorization 
of a mental and material sense of reality based 
mainly on mechanization. Narrative, unlike 
the power of logical reasoning and cognition, 
does not mechanize the real. Through its 
instruments and tools, logical reasoning is 
able only to build a self-explanatory picture 
of reality. “The spoken word and all the 
actions and deeds which the Greeks called 
prákseis or prágmata, as distinguished from 
poíesis, fabrication, can never outlast the 
moment of their realization, would never 
leave any trace without the help of 
r emembrance . ” 46 Na r r a t i ve  r a t he r 
accomplishes a magnitude beyond the mere 
rational information. This latter pretends to 
master the events “once and for all”.47 It is by 
45  ARENDT, Ibid. 8.
46  ARENDT, BPF 44. Arendt adds: “They do this 
by translating prákseis and léksis, action and speech, into 
that kind of poíesis or fabrication which eventually 
becomes the written word” Arendt, ibid., 45.
47  ARENDT MDT 21. As Bilsky accurately calls 
attention for, Benjamin captures this dimension of 
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no means a matter of mastering the past. It 
rather remains open to interpretation and 
retelling and thus “can set in motion a process 
of narration in which a plurality of voices and 
perspectives is visited.”48 By keeping the 
meaning of the events alive, narrative 
illuminates a dimension of suffering, horror, 
senselessness, which goes far beyond the 
limits of mere rationalized explanations.
To remember and to narrate our stories 
implicate to give life, to bring back, those 
implicated and those circumstances. In a 
word, it is to revive the scene. At the first 
sign, it may give the false impression it means 
merely to bear in mind our misfortune’ 
stories, mostly in a spectral form, as if the 
main achievement of remembering would be 
to stay deeply imbedded in the sorrows of our 
disgraceful experiences. Quite on the contrary, 
evoked by our capacity to recollect, repeating 
in imagination the happenings of our life, the 
capacity to remember opens a powerful 
dimension: the possibility of freeing us from 
excuses and resentments. Recalling Dinesen’s 
capacity for recollection, Arendt describes 
this quality of narrative as a sort of life elixir: 
narrative in his essay on storytelling: “It is half the ‘art’ 
of storytelling to keep a story from explanation as one 
reproduces it. …The most extraordinary things, 
marvelous things, are related with the greatest accuracy, 
but the psychological connection of the events is not 
forced on the reader. It is left up to him to interpret things 
the way he understands them, and thus the narrative 
achieves an amplitude that information lacks.” Walter 
Benjamin, Illumination, ed Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn, (New York, 1969) p. 89. Bilsky, Leora Y., “When 
Actor and Spectator Meet in the Courtroom: Reflections 
on Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Judgment.” In Beiner, 
R. & Nedelsky, J.,(eds.) Judgment, Imagination, and 
Politics – Themes from Kant and Arendt. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefiled Publishers, INC., 2001, p. 272
48 BILSKY, Ibid.
“Recollection, the repetition in imagination, 
may decipher the essence and deliver to you 
the ‘elixir’; and eventually you may even be 
privileged to ‘make’ something out of it, ‘to 
compound the story.’ But life itself is neither 
essence nor elixir, and if you treat it as such 
it will only play its tricks on you.”49 Here 
Arendt’s approach on reconciliation through 
narrative carries neither a sophisticated way 
of making up reality (the power of 
“reinventing” reality) nor an emerging 
language of victimization.
Arendt ultimately ascribes a communal 
and pluralistic dimension to narrative. The 
question of company is also deeply involved 
in remembering. Narrative depends on an “in 
between.”50 In the terms of The Human 
Condition, Arendt’s “subjective in-between” 
space is linked to narrative’s ability to 
49 ARENDT, MDT 109.
50 The spatiality of man-made worldly objects 
guarantees the durability and relative permanence of the 
world. This attribute of spatiality in the manufactured 
world creates a sort of space of maneuver, a shared, in-
between space. According to Arendt, the durability of 
what is created assures the reality of the world. The 
reality of life presupposes the eternal recurrence of 
natality. The birth of man also presumes the durability 
and stability of the world. Such a continuous and 
objective man-made world provides an objective space 
of reality (an objective in-between), the world of objects, 
the domain of fabrication, the poisis of the world 
properly speaking, and a subjective space of reality (a 
subjective in-between), the common otherness of 
language and action, the sphere of praxis and interaction 
that is responsible for establishing a sort of imaginary 
of the public thing. It is worth underlining that narrative 
plays a crucial role in guaranteeing this in-between 
subjective reality, and also grounds the possibility of 
judging, which is the outcome of a common world. It is 
in this sense that the plurality and otherness of narrative 
presuppose the subjective in-between space, the web of 
relationships among acting and speaking agents Arendt 
described in The Human Condition.
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constitute an in-between present. Narrative 
requires a location, which is found in the gap 
between the past and future. The present act 
of attention, whose invisible activity implies 
taking a position, in turn, depends on a search 
for meaning. “To assume the position of 
‘umpire,’ of arbiter and judge over the 
manifold, never-ending affairs of human 
existence in the world, never arriving at a 
final solution to their riddles but ready with 
ever-new answers to the question of what it 
mat be all about.”51 
This positioning has a twofold meaning. 
Firstly, Narrative’s ability to place itself in 
time occurs through the measure of a 
beginning and an end of what the mind 
brings into presence. This stands for man’s 
capacity to establish a present for himself.52 
Secondly, by attributing to narrative a 
capacity for breaking with the linear trilogy 
of time, we have another way of describing 
the dismantling of the metaphysical tradition. 
51 ARENDT, LMT 210. See: Benhabib, Seyla, 
“Judgment and The Moral Foundations of Politics in 
Arendt’s Thought.” In Political Theory 16/1 (February 
1988) pp. 29-51; Collin, Françoise, “Birth as Praxis,” in 
“The Judge and the Spectator – Hannah Arendt’s 
Political Philosophy, Joke j. Hermsen & Dana R. Villa 
(Eds.) Leuven: Peeters, 1999, pp. 97-110.
52  In The Life of the Mind, Willing’s volume, Arendt 
emphasizes: “Time that can be measured is in the mind 
itself; namely, ‘from the time I began to see until I cease 
to see.’ For ‘we measure in fact the interval from some 
beginning up to some kind of end,’ and this is possible 
only because the mind retains in its own present the 
expectation of that which is not yet, which it then ‘pays 
attention to and remembers when it passes through” 
Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind – Willing. New 
York/London: Ed. Harvest/HJB Book, 1978, p.107. See: 
Birulés, F., “Poetica e politica. Hannah Arendt, Abitare 
il present,” in La Politica tra Natalità e Mortalita – 
Hannah Arendt. Edited by Eugenia Parise (Napoli: 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1993), pp. 45-62.
It annihilates neither the necessary past nor 
the unpredictable future. Instead, it orients 
man in each new situation toward the 
responsibility to relocate himself, which, 
like all active experience, only takes place 
through judging the particular events.53
The question of company in which we 
share our stories also relates to that of 
judgment, since it concerns one of the 
concrete and particular domains in which we 
become spectators of our own life: when our 
words and deeds are told to others. In a way, 
through the ability to judge, narrative carries 
the capacity to conjugate the thinking ego and 
the ego that appears and moves through the 
world.54 There is an ethical redemptive and 
cathartic dimension here, in which the other 
plays a meaningful part. We can put our 
sorrows into a story in which the lead of 
narrative does not function in a merely logic 
descriptive way. “The scene where Ulysses 
listens to the story of his own life is 
paradigmatic for both history and poetry; the 
‘reconciliation with reality,’ the catharsis, 
which, according to Aristotle, was the essence 
53 See: Arendt, Hannah, Responsibility and Judgment. 
Edited and with an introduction by Jerome Kohn. New 
York: Schocken Books, 2003. See also: Assy, Bethania, 
Hannah Arendt – An Ethics of Personal Responsibility. 
Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, 
New York, Oxford, Wien, 2008; Bernauer, James, 
Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt. 
Edited by James W. Bernauer, Boston/Dordrecht/
Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987.
54 Kristeva accurately observes the poetic language 
of a narrator. See Kristeva, Julia, Hannah Arendt – Life 
Is a Narrative. Translated by Frank Collins, Toronto/
Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 2001, p. 
40 (Hereafter quoted as Kristeva, Hannah Arendt – Life 
Is a Narrative)
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of tragedy, … came about through the tears 
of remembrance.”55 
V. NARRATIVE: THE LIFE OF A 
WHO – A MATTER OF WORLD’S 
RECONCILIATION
Being the protagonist of our own story 
does not imply changing our social identity; 
as if tricking destiny meant merely changing 
those attributes that constitute what we are, 
putting in Arendt’s vocabulary at the Human 
Condition, namely, our qualities, gifts, 
talents, which we can display or hide.56 On 
the contrary, that which is distinctly us, what 
makes us unique human beings, is the 
constant ability of each of us, through act and 
speech, to dimension reality without erases 
the past, named by Arendt, who we are. “The 
narrative structure of action and of human 
identity means that the continuing retelling 
of the past, its continued reintegration into 
the story of the present, its reevaluation, 
55 ARENDT, BPF 45.
56 In The Human condition, Arendt makes a clear 
distinction between who and what we are. “In acting and 
speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and this make their appearance 
in the human world, while their physical identities 
appears without any activity of their own on the unique 
shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure 
of ‘who’ in contradiction to ‘what’ somebody is – his 
qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may 
display or hide – is implicit in everything somebody says 
and does.” Arendt, HC 179. Who someone is, his specific 
personal identity, akin to his personality, is not identified 
with his gifts, abilities, and talents. It is through the 
continuous actualization of personality, the constant 
exercise of thinking, that we are able to reaffirm our 
doxai, the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, what 
appears to me. This formulation in speech discloses who 
I am, a who that can only emerge in the phenomenal 
space of appearance. 
reassessment, and reconfiguration are 
ontological conditions of the kinds of beings 
we are”57 It is who we are that is responsible 
for the narrative structure of our identities. 
Acceptance here has no passive connotation. 
One accepts reality as provisional, since the 
who consists in the activity of reiterating 
oneself in each new, concrete and particular 
situation. This can involve an ethical leap, a 
leap into the deep understanding of the 
sorrowful features by being exposed to the 
world of appearance.58 
Narrative is related with the life that can 
be told as a story, “it is of this life, bios as 
distinguished from mere zoé, that Aristotle 
said that it ‘somehow is a kind of praxis.’”59 
This very possibility of narrating grounds 
human life in what is specific human, not 
merely as zoé, animal and physiological.60 As 
such, life is not a value in itself, it has his 
meaning reinvented, over and over again. 
Suffering can be unbearable, senseless, but it 
also gathers no significance in itself, it 
necessarily implies meaning.61 
57 ARENDT, Hannah, “Philosophy and Politics,” 
Social Research, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring 1990), p.98.
58 See the outstanding work of Agamben on the 
notions klésis-Beruf. Agamben, The Time That Remains. 
A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. Translated 
by Patricia Dailey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005 [Il tempo che resta. Un commento alla Lettera ai 
Romani, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000]
59 ARENDT, HC 97
60 See Kristeva, Hannah Arendt: Life Is a Narrative.
61 A good parallel can be drawn with the issue of 
equality as a narrative as well. It is open to discussion 
in the public domain and is a matter of neither rational 
nor factual truth. It is a matter of opinion, and human 
equality depends upon such choices. As beautifully put 
by Lefort: “Inequality and invisibility go hand in hand. 
This in itself is enough to suggest that, for Arendt, 
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Arendt argues that what the Romans 
called Humanitas, a unique and vital identity, 
can only be achieved by throwing oneself into 
the so-called “adventure of the public 
realm.”62 The uniqueness of our identity 
embraces unavoidable the capacity to take 
and to overcome the risk. Humanitas embodies 
precisely the courage to be exposed to the 
unpredictability of life. By that reason, a leap 
into our own life is an ethical leap; the 
courage to submit ourselves to life, and the 
narrative’s power of attributing meaning to 
it. Humanitas is described as something 
occupying or appearing in a metal space. 
Narrative is one of the keys to access such 
mental space. The act of narrating carries the 
capacity for achieving Humanitas. It means 
neither a matter of “changing the way events 
were” in order to make the story bearable, 
nor just a mere process of rationalizing 
suffering. The miracle of narrative carries a 
sort of potentiality of changing the past 
without changing the past, holding the 
unpredictable moment of reconciliation.
This reconciliation with our destinies 
recalls Heller’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence in her Ethics of Personality. 
“The first feature is gratitude towards one’s 
own life inherent in amor fati, a prominent 
characteristic of an ethics of personality. A 
person who conduct his life in the spirit of an 
equality is an invention; it is an effect or simply a sign 
of the moment which raises men above life and opens 
them up to a common world.” Claude Lefort, “Hannah 
Arendt and the Political,” in Democracy and Political 
Theory, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 
1989, p. 51.
62 It is noteworthy to recall Jaspers’ conduct into 
public life. See Arendt, “Karl Jaspers: A Laudation,” in 
Arendt MDT 73-74. See also: Pirro, Hannah Arendt and 
the Politics of Tragedy, p. 122
ethics of personality will always say ‘yes’ to 
his own life, irrespective of his suffering, his 
solitude, his marginalization, or his bad luck 
in all matters that are external to his 
personality. A ‘lucky throw of the dice’ says 
‘yes’ to his own life (and thus to life in 
general). Not because he is lucky in life, but 
because it is his life, his fate, because he 
became what he has (always) been. Here we 
arrive at the deepest layer of Nietzsche’s 
vision of the eternal recurrence of the same. 
To accept the mythological image of the 
eternal recurrence of the same with gratitude 
and gaiety is tantamount to wishing to live 
one’s own life again and again, and never 
another life, never in another place or in 
another time.”63 Nietzsche points out in Ecce 
Homo that while writing Zarathustra he was 
filled by “the Yes-saying pathos par excellence”: 
“the tragic pathos, was alive in me to the 
highest degree.”64 Saying “Yes” to life is the 
tragic pathos of choosing ourselves.
It is not by chance that by making natality 
the core of her philosophy, Arendt privileges 
the unpredictability of life over the anticipatory 
future of being-for-death. This gratitude for 
life is passed down through memory. Natality, 
for its part, privileges memory65 by bringing 
out our capacity to judge our irreversible past 
injuries and mistakes as spectators. Positively 
63 HELLER, Agnes, An Ethics of Personality, 
Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, p. 17.
64 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Thus spoke 
Zarathustra,’ p. 296, In On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Ecce Homo. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989.
65 See the beautiful essay by Antonella Bullo, 
“Natalità, Mortalità e Memoria,” In Hannah Arendt, 
introduzione e cura di Simona Forti, Millano: Bruno 
Mondadori, 1999, p.194.
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valuing narrative by not means assigns for 
attributing to speech and acts the same 
apparatus as inner rational truth, transposed 
to the realm of visibility. In giving a 
metaphorical sense of natality to narrative, 
by making our suffering bearable, Arendt 
seeks to reestablish the dignity of who we are 
into the public sphere, as the realm of an 
ethics that can make sharing life in society 
worthwhile. In other words, reconciliation 
promoted through narrative can only appear 
where a public space exists. That is the deeper 
significance of the public realm in the acting 
of narrating our stories to the others. Thus, 
perishable individual qualities and talents 
constant displayed by what we are is not the 
rain material of narrative. It gathers no ethical 
meaning into the public realm. Only the 
ongoing activity of reconciling ourselves with 
what we went through  has a revelatory 
character of who we are, giving us a deep 
sense of Humanität.66
A singular personal identity can only 
appear in the form of acts and speech in the 
66 Arendt’s concern to describe who someone is 
never falls into the vocabulary of what someone is. 
“The manifestation of who the speaker and doer 
unexchangeably is, though it is plainly visible, retains 
a curious intangibility that confounds all efforts toward 
unequivocal verbal expression. The moment we want 
to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us 
astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in an 
description of qualities he necessarily shares with others 
like him; we being to describe a type or a ‘character’ 
in the old meaning of the word, with the result that he 
specific uniqueness escapes us.” Arendt, HC 181. She 
continues: “the well-known philosophic impossibility 
to arrive at a definition of man, all definitions being 
determinations or interpretations of what man is, of 
qualities, therefore, which he could possibly share with 
other living beings, whereas his specific difference 
would be found in a determination of what kind of a 
‘who’ he is.” Arendt, Ibid.
space between men. Silence and passivity, 
extra-worldly refuges of interiority, are 
antagonistic to discourse and action, this 
latter only takes places where who we are can 
become known and brought into the luminous 
world, and consequently, reconciled with the 
senseless unbearable suffering one 
experienced. Narrative gathers then 
reconciliation with, and the new beginning 
for, our sense of trust in the world. It also can 
restore the courage of each free man to throw 
himself again into the unpredictability and 
irreversibility of action. Courage consists 
here in throwing oneself into in the plurality 
of the common world; an act of freedom that 
ethically dignifies him into the public space 
of appearance.67
The revelatory role of the storyteller relies 
also on his ability to make some truths more 
supportable. One of its most radical examples 
concerns the astonishing power of Holocaust 
survivors’ testimony, which brings forth facts 
that would otherwise never reach the 
brightness of the public domain. They are the 
only ones who can convey the unimaginable 
reality of the concentration camps, and of the 
“Muselmänner” Agamben situates at the 
threshold between man and non-man. 
Without testimonies, the atrocities would 
remain “un-truth.”68 This is not just a matter 
67 See: Étienne Tassin, Le Trésor Perdu, – Hannah 
Arendt, L’Intelligence de L’Action Politique. Paris: 
Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1999. p. 342; Giusti, Roberto, 
Antropologia della Libertà – A comunità delle singolarità 
in Hannah Arendt, Assisi: Cittadella Editrice, 1999.
68 See: Giorgio Agamben, Lo Que Queda de 
Auschwitz – El Arquivo y el Testigo Homo Sacer III. 
Traducción de Antonio Gimeno Cuspinera. Valencia: 
Pre-textos, 2000. See also: Diner, Dan, “On the Banal and 
the Evil in Her Holocaust Narrative.” In New German 
Critique, N. 71, (Spring-Summer 1997): 177-190.
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of “telling the truth,” but of revealing an 
insupportable reality. Yet by telling a story, 
testimony not only gives it reality, it can make 
the reality less unbearable. It is not narrative 
itself, in the sense of some kind of 
understanding, rationalism, or analysis that 
Arendt attributes the capacity to think horror. 
On the other hand, it is neither irrationalism. 
It is rather an extended thinking of narrative, 
able to reach beyond the limits of rationalizing 
reason. That is the reason why narrative is in 
tension between bio theórétikos and zoé. 
Narrative can assign neither for the 
rationalizing cognitive process due to the 
professional philosophers, nor for the mere 
vital process of the animal, physiological life, 
the so called bare life by Agamben.
Narrative, as an activity in itself, 
contributes in another life, in our life as bios 
politicos, since it necessarily requests shared 
meaning and judgment, the essence of 
political life for Arendt. “Narrative participates 
in another politics, that of open memory, 
renewed and shared memory that she [Arendt] 
calls the life of a who.”69 Shared memory is 
a matter of the public world, since it leaves 
“the structural potentialities of narration as 
wide-open and infinite political action, 
offered to the judging perspicacity of inter-
esse.”70 It is an open path to reconciliation 
69 KRISTEVA, Hannah Arendt: Life Is a Narrative, 
p. 43. 
70 KRISTEVA, Ibid. Regarding Arendt’s approach 
on judging and politics, see: Denneny, Michael, “The 
Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment.” 
In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 
edited by Melvyn A. Hill, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1979, McClure, Kirstie, “The Odor of judgment: 
Exemplarity, Propriety, and Politics in the Company of 
Hannah Arendt.” In Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of 
with our trust in the plural world of appearance. 
Narrative remains this tremendous human 
potentiality of new beginning, a sort of 
miracle keeping into motion the possibility 
of the unpredictable moment of a metaphorical 
natality in face of the unbearable life.
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